It is a well known rule that the death caused under grave provocation tending him to lose his self control will make him liable for the culpable not amounting to murder and the same has been stated in Sec 300 Exception 1 as ‘: When culpable homicide is not murder, Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person of who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident’. But there is a need to understand up to what extent does provocation constitutes a mitigating factor under the criminal law and whether grave and sudden provocation can be admissible as a defence.
The classic definition of provocation has been approved by the court in R vs. Duffy [(1949) 1 All ER 932], as “ provocation is some act or series of acts done or words spoken which would cause in any reasonable person and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his or her mind”.
It is important to analyse the phrase ‘sudden and temporary loss of self control’ as it constitutes an essential ingredient of the defence of provocation. It serves to emphasise the fact that the defence is concerned with the actions of an individual who is not at the moment the master of his or her mind. It has to be taken into account the interval between the provocative conduct and the fatal act of the defendant. Such an interval commonly referred to as the ‘cooling off period’ determines the defence of provocation and it depends wholly on the facts of the case and is not defined as a principle of law. The famous case of K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1962 SC 605] describes the time gap between the provocation and retaliatory action. If the sufficient period of time has elapsed after the provocation then the accused cannot take the plea that the death was caused due to sudden anger or provocation. Although in almost every case such an interval infer a time for cooling and regaining self control of the mental state in some cases it has an opposite effect.
The ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ is a psychological theory propounded by Dr. Lenore Walker to help explain why abused women choose to kill their abusive partners instead of simply leaving them. In a murder case, one of the most popular defences offered by a battered woman is provocation. In order to protect battered women, the jury should consider the relevant circumstances, nature of the provocative act, relevant conditions in which the act occurred, the defendant's sensitivity or lack thereof, and the time, if any, that elapsed between the provocation and the act that resulted in death. Hence, there was a necessity to acknowledge the need to revamp the orthodox defence of provocation and the UK played an important role in its reformation. They included ‘cumulative provocation’ within the ambit of provocation. In the case, Regina vs. Kiranjit Ahluwalia [[1992] 4 All ER 889], it was held that a delayed loss of self-control would not preclude the applicability of the defence of provocation; however, the longer the delay, the higher the chances that provocation as a defence would fail. The facts of the case were, The appellant poured petrol and caustic soda on her sleeping husband and then set fire to him. He died six days later from his injuries. The couple had an arranged marriage and the husband had been violent and abusive throughout the marriage. He was also having an affair. On the night of the killing he had threatened to hit her with an iron and told her that he would beat her the next day if she did not provide him with money. At her trial she admitted killing her husband but raised the defence of provocation however, the jury convicted her of murder. She appealed on the grounds that the judge's direction to the jury relating to provocation was wrong and she also raised the defence of diminished responsibility. It was held that the judge's direction on provocation was correct and the appeal on the grounds of provocation was therefore unsuccessful.
India, acknowledging the problems of grave and sudden provocation introduced the concept of ‘Sustained provocation’ even before the English Courts had adopted cumulative provocation. The Madras High court in the case Suyambukkani v. State of TN [1989 LW (Cri) 86], recognized the ‘Nallathangal syndrome’ as equivalent to battered women syndrome of the UK. Accordingly, the court has reduced the sentence of the abused women and held that if the law recognizes that a battered wife may commit suicide due to surrounding circumstances, it should also recognize that proximate surroundings may cause her to kill the batterer. Indian jurisprudence on Battered women syndrome has not progressed beyond the ‘Nallathangal syndrome’ and thus, there is a need to accordingly initiate a comprehensive reformation on battered women who retaliate and their interaction with the law in India.