1Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellate Tribunal’ or ‘NCLAT.’
2Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ or ‘NCLT’.
3Hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC’ or ‘the Code’.
4For short, ‘CIRP’.
5For short, ‘CoC’.
6For short, ‘IRP’.
4.1. The corporate debtor is a real estate company engaged in construction of various projects, mostly in the National Capital Region, which received credit facilities from Union Bank of India by way of sanction letter dated 19.10.2013/16.12.2013, in the sum of Rs. 150 crore, for the development of the “Eco Village-II Project.” Subsequently, Union Bank of India and Bank of Baroda entered into an agreement, extending secondcredit facilities in the sum of Rs. 200 crore, with Union Bank of India’s total exposure being Rs. 100 crore, as sanctioned by letter dated 21.11.2015.
4.2. The credit facilities provided by Union Bank of India to the corporate debtor were secured through a mortgage, corporate guarantees, and personal guarantees. As a result of the corporate debtor’s default on the loan repayment, the account was declared as a ‘Non-Performing Asset’ on 20.06.2018.
4.3. Union Bank of India filed an application under Section 7 of the Code on 20.03.2021, claiming a total amount of Rs. 431,92,53,302 as on 31.01.2021, along with accrued interest. The NCLT, by its order dated 25.03.2022, admitted the Section 7 application and directed for initiation of CIRP for the corporate debtor. Following this, Mr. Hitesh Goel – respondent No. 3 was appointed as the IRP.
4.4. Aggrieved by this order so passed by NCLT, respondent No. 1 – promoter/suspended director of corporate debtor filed an appeal before NCLAT. On 12.04.2022, an interim order was passed by NCLAT, directing that CoC shall not be constituted until the next date. The said order continued until passing of the impugned order dated 10.06.2022.
4.5. In the impugned order dated 10.06.2022, the Appellate Tribunal partly modified its order dated 12.04.2022 and issued interim directions, including constitution of CoC for Eco Village Project-II only; the said projectto be completed with assistance of ex-management whereas other projects, apart from Eco Village-II, were ordered to be continued as ongoing projects. The interim directions in the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 read as follows: -
7.1. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant - Union Bank of India that the financial institutions, including appellant, have funded the corporate debtor as a single corporate entity irrespective of the fact that the funds are being utilised for a single project or multiple projects. Therefore, the credit facility extended by the appellant does not get converted to ‘project finance’ allowing resolution through ‘project based insolvency’ mechanism; and the scheme of IBC envisages CIRP of whole corporate entity that is to be carried out only through CoC mandated to be constituted for the corporate debtor as a whole instead of only one of its projects. Moreover, any procedure that allows the erstwhile management, the cause of suspension of the projects, to participate as a resolution applicant or in any other form or to receive funds from a third party for the corporate debtor will defeat the purpose of the Code, as it is in violation of Section 29-A of the Code as well as various judgments of this Court; and there are serious delinquencies dimension against the ex-management. It is submitted that the appellant is in favour of the investment being made by any third party on the primary condition that the ex-management is not included for resolution of the corporate debtor.
7.2. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant – Indiabulls Asset and Reconstruction Company Ltd. that the impugned order restricting constitution of CoC only to Eco Village-II is required to be modified to constitute CoC for entire company; promoter/erstwhile management of the corporate debtor should have no involvement in CIRP and must maintain the status quo concerning the assets of the corporate debtor.
7.3. It has been submitted on behalf of promotor-respondent No.1 that interim direction No. (i) and (ii) issued by the Appellate Tribunal be modified to include Eco Village-II project also within the interim arrangement. Additionally, the ex-management of the corporate debtor may be allowed to carry out the execution of the interim funding and settlement plan under the supervision of IRP, which could be monitored by a Monitoring Committee designated by this Court. Further, the IRP, ex-management, and the Monitoring Committee be required to submit quarterly progress reports to NCLAT, or alternatively, to this Court. It has also been submitted that no coercive action be taken against assets of corporate debtor, its promoters, directors and management which otherwise would delay completion of projects.
7.4. It has been submitted on behalf of IRP that interim directions issued by the Appellate Tribunal, by way of the impugned order, deserve not to be interfered with; the construction can be monitored by a steering committee which can file reports every quarter; and directions may be issued to initiate efforts to procure interim financing for all of the corporate debtor's projects, which would include both Eco Village-II and Non-Eco Village II projects.
7.5. It has been submitted on behalf of home buyers of Eco Village-II that the direction be issued to complete the construction of the said project in a similar manner as envisaged for other home buyers for whom no CoC has been constituted and construction deserves to be completed under supervision of IRP with assistance of ex-management.
7.6. It has been submitted on behalf of other home buyers that the impugned order deserves not to be interfered with and direction may be issued to NCLAT to complete the process of approval and infusion of funds from proposed investor; a Monitoring Committee may be formed in regard to interim arrangement and settlement plan and due diligence report may be circulated for their opinion; and no coercive action to be taken against assets of the corporate debtor.
“194. In addition to the general principles for exercise of discretion, as discussed hereinbefore, a few features specific to the matters of interim relief need special mention. It is rather elementary that in the matters of grant of interim relief, satisfaction of the Court only about existence of prima facie case in favour of the suitor is not enough. The other elements i.e., balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury, are not of empty formality and carry their own relevance; and while exercising its discretion in the matter of interim relief and adopting a particular course, the Court needs to weigh the risk of injustice, if ultimately the decision of main matter runs counter to the course being adopted at the time of granting or refusing the interim relief. We may usefully refer to the relevant principle stated in the decision of Chancery Division in Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd. : (1986) 3 All ER 772 as under:—
“....The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court may make the “wrong” decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is therefore that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been “wrong” in the sense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of both kinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle.”
(Emphasis in bold Supplied)
195. While referring to various expositions in the said decision, this Court, in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden : (1990) 2 SCC 117 observed as under:—
“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.
17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”
(Emphasis in bold Supplied)
196. In keeping with the principles aforesaid, one of the simple questions to be adverted to at the threshold stage in the present cases was, as to whether the importers (writ petitioners) were likely to suffer irreparable injury in case the interim relief was denied and they were to ultimately succeed in the writ petitions. A direct answer to this question would have made it clear that their injury, if at all, would have been of some amount of loss of profit, which could always be measured in monetary terms and, usually, cannot be regarded as an irreparable one. Another simple but pertinent question would have been concerning the element of balance of convenience; and a simple answer to the same would have further shown that the inconvenience which the importers were going to suffer because of the notifications in question was far lesser than the inconvenience which the appellants were going to suffer (with ultimate impact on national interest) in case operation of the notifications was stayed and thereby, the markets of India were allowed to be flooded with excessive quantity of the said imported peas/pulses.”
Civil Appeal No. 1975 of 2023
Regarding interlocutory applications